This paper develops a model of policy regime uncertainty and its consequences for stabilizing expectations. Because of learning dynamics, uncertainty about monetary and …scal policy is shown to restrict, relative to a rational expectations analysis, the set of policies consistent with macroeconomic stability. Anchoring expectations by communicating about monetary and …scal policy enlarges the set of policies consistent with stability. However, absent anchored …scal expectations, the advantages from anchoring monetary expectations are smaller the larger is the average level of indebtedness. Finally, even when expectations are stabilized in the long run, the higher are average debt levels the more persistent will be the e¤ects of disturbances out of rational expectations equilibrium.
Introduction
Following Taylor (1993) a large literature has developed arguing that a simple linear relationship between nominal interest rates, in ‡ation and some measure of real activity, can account for the behavior of the Federal Reserve and central banks in a number of developed countries.
Subsequent theoretical and applied work on monetary policy has introduced such rules as behavioral equations for policy makers in general equilibrium models. Simple rules have the desirable property of stabilizing expectations when policy is su¢ ciently active in response to developments in the macroeconomy. This property is often referred to as the Taylor principle.
It assumes that …scal policy is 'passive'and the resulting equilibrium Ricardian, implying that in ‡ation and real activity are independent of …scal variables, and that agents have complete knowledge of the economic environment; in particular, the monetary and …scal regime. 1 The appropriateness of this view rests on policy being of a particular kind and on the absence of regime change. Yet the recent U.S. …nancial crisis and recession demonstrates episodes of unconventional policy occasionally punctuate conventional policy. And in such times there exists profound uncertainty about the scale, scope and duration of the stance of stabilization policy -witness the extensive discussions of 'exit strategies'for monetary and …scal policy. More generally, there are clearly historical episodes indicating on-going shifts in the con…guration of monetary and …scal policy in the U.S. post-war era. They suggest that policy might better be described by evolving combinations of active and passive policy rules, for which monetary policy may or may not satisfy the Taylor principle, and equilibrium may or may not be Ricardian. 2 Given these observations, it seems reasonable both to consider con…gurations of policy that di¤er to the standard account and to assume that in the initial phase of a given policy regime market participants lack full information about policy and its e¤ects on the macroeconomy. This paper evaluates the consequences of uncertainty about the prevailing policy regime for the e¢ cacy of stabilization policy. We consider a model of near-rational expectations where market participants and policy makers have incomplete knowledge about the structure of the economy. Private agents are optimizing, have a completely speci…ed belief system, but do not know the equilibrium mapping between observed state variables and market clearing prices. 1 The term 'passive' follows the language of Leeper (1991) . The descriptor 'Ricardian' follows Woodford (1996) : for all sequences of prices, the …scal accounts of the government are intertemporally solvent. Conversely, passive monetary and active …scal policy lead to non-Ricardian equilibribria described later. 2 The bond price support regime in the U.S. in the late 1940s discussed by Woodford (2001) , and recent empirical evidence of shifting policy rules by Davig and Leeper (2006) , are two examples.
By extrapolating from historical patterns in observed data they approximate this mapping to forecast exogenous variables relevant to their decision problems, such as prices and policy variables. Unless the monetary and …scal authorities credibly announce the policy regime in place, agents are assumed to lack knowledge of the policy rules. Because agents must learn from historical data, beliefs need not be consistent with the objective probabilities implied by the economic model. Expectations need not be consistent with implemented monetary and …scal policy -in contrast to a rational expectations analysis of the model. 3 This permits a meaningful notion of 'anchored expectations'.
A policy regime is characterized by a monetary policy rule that speci…es nominal interest rates as a function of expected in ‡ation and a tax rule that describes how the structural surplus is adjusted in response to outstanding public debt. The central bank has imperfect knowledge about the current state: it has to forecast the current in ‡ation rate to implement policy. It, like households and …rms, must learn from historical data. The central bank therefore reacts with a delay to changing economic conditions: argued to be characteristic of actual policymaking -see McCallum (1999) . Stabilization policy is harder because it is more di¢ cult to predict business cycle ‡uctuations.
Policy regime changes are not explicitly modelled. Instead, a stationary model environment is studied: policy rules are constant for all time. In contrast to rational expectations, we assume that initial expectations are not consistent with the policy regime in place. The environment constitutes a best-case scenario. If agents are unable to learn the policy reaction functions describing monetary and …scal policy in a stationary environment, then learning such objects when there are changes in policy regime can only occur under more stringent conditions. As such, the analysis likely understates the severity of inference problems that agents face.
The analysis commences by identifying a class of policies that ensures determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium in our model. The requirements for determinacy are called the Leeper conditions -after Leeper (1991) -which de…ne the set of policies under consideration. Within this class, policy rules are considered desirable if they have the additional property of stabilizing expectations under imperfect information, in the sense that expectations under learning dynamics converge to the rational expectations equilibrium associated with a given policy regime. This is adjudged by the property of expectational stability developed by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . Good policy should be robust to both central bank and private agents'imperfect knowledge.
This robustness property is assessed in three scenarios which successively resolve uncertainty about the policy regime: i) agents have no knowledge of the monetary and …scal policy regime; ii) agents understand the monetary policy strategy of the central bank. This implies all details of the central bank's monetary policy rule are correctly understood so that agents make policy-consistent forecasts. Monetary expectations are said to be anchored; and iii) agents further understand that …scal policy is conducted to ensure the intertemporal solvency of the government budget. In which case, …scal expectations are consistent with long-run policy and said to be anchored. Within each scenario two regimes are considered: one with active monetary and passive …scal policy and one with passive monetary and active …scal policy.
Four results are of note. First, under regime uncertainty, stabilization policy with simple rules is demonstrated to be more di¢ cult than in a rational expectations analysis of the model: the menu of policies consistent with expectations stabilization is narrowed considerably relative to the Leeper conditions. Instability arises due to a failure of traditional aggregate demand management. It is shown that when both monetary and …scal policy are not well understood, uncertainty about monetary policy is the main source of instability. As real interest rates are not accurately projected, anticipated future changes in monetary policy are less e¤ective in managing current aggregate demand.
Second, resolving uncertainty about monetary policy and thereby anchoring monetary expectations improves the stabilization properties of simple rules, in the sense that a larger set of policies are consistent with stabilizing expectations. Independently of the policy regime in place, the improvement in macroeconomic stability stems from e¤ective demand management, as the evolution of real interest rates becomes more predictable. However, the extent of advantage a¤orded by anchored monetary expectations depends on the economy's debt-to-output ratio. The more heavily indebted an economy, the smaller the menu of policies consistent with stability. Only in a zero debt economy are the full set of policies given by the Leeper conditions consistent with expectational stability. That average indebtedness mitigates the e¢ cacy of stabilization policy stems from departures from Ricardian equivalence under learning -compare Barro (1974) . These wealth e¤ects on aggregate demand have magnitude proportional to the average debt-to-output ratio of the economy and can be destabilizing:
tighter monetary policy to restrain in ‡ation expectations can lead to positive valuation ef-fects on holdings of the public debt, which stimulates demand. These …ndings resonate with practical policy-making, which frequently cites concern about the size of the public debt for stabilization policy.
Third, in addition to anchoring monetary expectations, anchoring …scal expectations by communicating details of the long-run conduct of …scal policy restores the full menu of policies described by the Leeper conditions. An economy with anchored …scal expectations is shown to be isomorphic to a zero debt economy. This suggests that communication about …scal policy may be as important as communication about monetary policy in high debt economies. The constraints imposed on monetary policy by indebtedness only matter to the extent that agents are unsure about the long-term consequences of …scal policy. Fiscal uncertainty compromises monetary policy in economies with non-trivial public debt.
Fourth, because of departures from Ricardian equivalence, if agents are uncertain about the intertemporal solvency of the government accounts, the stock of debt can be a source of macroeconomic instability even when expectational stability is guaranteed. We analyze the dynamic response of the economy to a small shock to in ‡ation expectations (equivalent to a change in the perceived in ‡ation target) in a zero and high debt economy. Relative to zero debt economies, a shock to in ‡ation expectations in high debt economies leads to persistent ‡uctuations in in ‡ation and output before convergence to rational expectations equilibrium.
Indebtedness fundamentally changes an economy's response to shocks and undermines the e¢ cacy of simple rules for stabilization policy.
Related Literature: The analysis owes much to Leeper (1991) and the subsequent literature on the …scal theory of the price level -see, in particular, Sims (1994 ), Woodford (1996 and Cochrane (1998) . It also contributes to a growing literature on policy design under learning dynamics -see, inter alia, Howitt (1992) , Bullard and Mitra (2002 , 2006 ), Bullard and Eusepi (2008 , Eusepi (2007) , Evans and Honkapohja (2003 , 2005 , 2006 , Preston (2005 Preston ( , 2006 Preston ( , 2008 -but is most directly related to Evans and Honkapohja (2007) and Eusepi and Preston (2008a) . Evans and Honkapohja (2007) considers the interaction of monetary and …scal policy in the context of Leeper's model under learning dynamics rather than rational expectations. The analysis here advances their …ndings by considering a model in which agents are optimizing conditional on their beliefs. Eusepi and Preston (2008a) analyzes the role of communication in stabilizing expectations. The presence or absence of knowledge about the policy regime is adapted from the notions of full communication and no communication developed in that paper. The results here di¤er in non-trivial ways as a broader class of …scal policy is considered. Rather than assuming a zero-debt passive …scal policy, which is understood by households, the analysis here considers a class of passive and active …scal policies determined by the dual speci…cation of a tax rule, which is unknown to agents, and choice of debt-to-output ratio. This engenders signi…cantly richer model predictions regarding policy interactions and expectations stabilization, because agents must forecast future taxes to make current spending decisions and because holdings of the public debt are treated as net wealth. Wherefore this more general framework permits evaluating the advantages of communication about …scal policy, an under studied topic.
A Simple Model
The following section details a model similar in spirit to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003) . The major di¤erence is the incorporation of near-rational beliefs delivering an anticipated utility model as described by Kreps (1998) and Sargent (1999) . The analysis follows Marcet and Sargent (1989a) and Preston (2005) , solving for optimal decisions conditional on current beliefs.
Microfoundations
Households: The economy is populated by a continuum of households which seeks to maximize future expected discounted utilitŷ
where utility depends on a consumption index, C i T , the amount of labor supplied for the production of each good j, h i T , and the quantity of government expenditures g > 0. 4 The consumption index, C i t , is the Dixit-Stiglitz constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregator of the economy's available goods and has associated price index written, respectively, as
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods and c i t (j) and p t (j) denote household i's consumption and the price of good j. The discount factor is assumed to satisfy 0 < < 1.
4 The adopted functional form facilitates analytical results. Ê i t denotes the beliefs at time t held by each household i; which satisfy standard probability laws. Section 3 describes the precise form of these beliefs and the information set available to agents when forming expectations. Households and …rms observe only their own objectives, constraints and realizations of aggregate variables that are exogenous to their decision problems and beyond their control. They have no knowledge of the beliefs, constraints and objectives of other agents in the economy: in consequence agents are heterogeneous in their information sets in the sense that even though their decision problems are identical, they do not know this to be true.
Asset markets are assumed to be incomplete. The only asset in non-zero net supply is government debt to be discussed below. The household's ‡ow budget constraint is
where B i t is household {'s holdings of the public debt, R t the gross nominal interest rate, W t the nominal wage and T t lump-sum taxes. t denotes pro…ts from holding shares in an equal part of each …rm and P t is the aggregate price level de…ned below. Period nominal income is determined as 
and intertemporal budget constraint
and z denotes the steady-state value of any variable z t .
Solving the Euler equation recursively backwards, taking expectations at time t and substituting into the intertemporal budget constraint giveŝ
are the structural surplus (de…ned below), the steady-state consumption-to-income ratio and the steady-state structural surplus-to-income ratio. 6 Optimal consumption decisions depend on current wealth and on the expected future path of after-tax income and the real interest rate. 7 The optimal allocation rule is analogous to permanent income theory, with di¤erences emerging from allowing variations in the real rate of interest, which can occur due to variations in either the nominal interest rate or in ‡ation. As households become more patient, current consumption demand is more sensitive to expectations about future macroeconomic conditions.
The steady-state structural surplus-to-income ratio, , a¤ects consumption decisions in three ways: i) it determines after-tax income; ii) it reduces the elasticity of consumption spending with respect to real interest rates; and iii) it indexes wealth e¤ects on consumption spending that result from variations in the real value of government debt holdings. To interpret these e¤ects further it is useful to consider aggregate consumption demand. Aggregating over the continuum and rearranging provideŝ
where
give aggregate consumption demand; total outstanding public debt; and average expectations.
The second line gives the usual terms that arise from permanent income theory. The term premultiplied by s 1 C in the …rst line is the intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
In a rational expectations analysis of the model, this is an equilibrium restriction known to be equal to zero. However, agents might face uncertainty about the current …scal regime. 8 And under arbitrary subjective expectations, households will in general incorrectly forecast future tax obligations and real interest rates, leading to holdings of the public debt being perceived as net wealth: Ricardian equivalence need not hold out of rational expectations equilibrium.
The failure of Ricardian equivalence leads to wealth e¤ects on consumption demand, and the magnitude of these e¤ects is indexed by the structural surplus-to-output ratio, or equivalently the debt-to-output ratio as these steady-state quantities are proportional. 9 On average, the more indebted an economy the larger are the e¤ects on demand. This is shown to be important in the design of stabilization policy.
Finally, note that if either the debt-to-output ratio is zero or the intertemporal budget constraint is for some reason known to hold by households, then consumption demand is determined by the second term only, delivering the model analyzed by Preston (2005 Preston ( , 2006 . 10 Those papers consider the case of a zero-debt …scal policy, understood to hold in all future periods so that households need not forecast taxes. This paper extends that analysis to a considerably broader class of …scal policies that agents must learn about -with non-trivial consequence.
Firms. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms. Each di¤erentiated consumption good is produced according to the linear production function y t (j) = A t h t (j) where A t > 0 denotes an aggregate technology shock. Each …rm faces a demand curve Y t (j) = (P t (j) =P t ) Y t , where Y t denotes aggregate output, and solves a Calvo-style price-setting 8 The tax rule is such that each household faces the same tax pro…le. However, agents are not aware of this: in forecasting future tax obligations they consider the possibility that their individual tax pro…le might have changed.
9 Leith and von Thadden (2006) in Blanchard-Yaari model with rational expectations show that holdings of the public debt are treated as net wealth which has implications for determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium. However, the model structures are quite di¤erent. In their case, the probability of death gets built into the overall discount factor which in turn permits deviations from Ricardian equivalence. This is distinct to the structure inherent in (5).
1 0 In general, assuming knowledge of the intertemporal budget constraint is questionable as it is just one of the many equilibrium restrictions that households are attempting to learn. problem where prices can be optimally chosen in any period with probability 0 < 1
A price p is chosen to maximize the expected discounted value of pro…tŝ
denotes period T pro…ts. Given the incomplete markets assumption it is assumed that …rms value future pro…ts according to the marginal rate of substitution evaluated at aggregate
Denote the optimal price p t . Since all …rms changing prices in period t face identical decision problems, the aggregate price index evolves according to
Log-linearizing the …rst-order condition for the optimal price giveŝ
is average marginal costs de…ned below. Each …rm's current price depends on the expected future path of real marginal costs and in ‡ation. The higher the degree of nominal rigidity, the greater the weight on future in ‡ation in determining current prices. The average real marginal cost function is t = W t = (P t A t ) = Y t =A t , where the second equality comes from the household's labor supply decision. Log-linearizing provideŝ This class of rule has had considerable popularity in the recent literature on monetary policy. It ensures determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium if the Taylor principle is satis…ed. More importantly, the central bank is here appropriately modelled as an agent that must learn. Central banks face uncertainty about the current state, and particularly in ‡ation.
For example, in the U.S., in any given quarter only an estimate of the current CPI in ‡ation rate is available from the BLS. Furthermore, even if uncertainty about a given in ‡ation measure is small, there remains considerable uncertainty about to which measure of in ‡ationary pressure ought the central bank respond. Aside from measurement issues, the informational assumption is congruous with identi…cation strategies adopted in vector autoregression studies on the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks -see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) . It also resonates with evidence adduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) on the response of spending and pricing decisions to monetary policy shocks. While the present study assumes households and …rms make decisions based on time t information, rather than time t 1 information, Eusepi and Preston (2008a) makes clear that such timing would tend to exacerbate instability from learning since agents possess less information about the determination of prices.
Similar results would obtain in a model in which monetary policy is conditioned on expectations of next-period in ‡ation given time t information. Preference is given to (6) because of the above mentioned measurement issues and because it implies identical determinacy conditions to a policy in which the central bank perfectly observes current in ‡ation. Regardless, what is to be emphasized is the central bank is realistically described as learning about the current state.
Fiscal Policy: The …scal authority …nances government purchases of g per period by
issuing public debt and levying lump-sum taxes. Denoting B t as the outstanding government debt at the beginning of any period t, and assuming for simplicity that the public debt is comprised entirely of one-period riskless nominal Treasury bills, government liabilities evolve according to
It is convenient to rewrite this constraint as
where s t = T t =P t g denotes the primary surplus and b t = B t =P t 1 a measure of the real value of the public debt. Observe that b t is a predetermined variable since W t is determined a period in advance. 12 The government's ‡ow budget constraint satis…es the log-linear approximation
The model is closed with an assumption on the path of primary surpluses fs t g. 13 Analogous to the monetary authority, it is assumed that the …scal authority adjusts the primary surplus according to the one-parameter family of rules
where s; b > 0 are constants coinciding with the steady-state level of the primary surplus and the public debt respectively. 0 is a policy parameter. The …scal authority faces no uncertainty about outstanding liabilities as they are determined a period in advance. The tax rule satis…es the log-linear approximationŝ
Market clearing and aggregate dynamics
General equilibrium requires goods market clearing,
This relation satis…es the log-linear approximation
It is useful to characterize the natural rate of output -the level of output that would prevail absent nominal rigidities under rational expectations. Under these assumptions, optimal price setting implies the log-linear approximationŶ n t = a t . Movements in the natural rate of output are determined by variations in aggregate technology shocks. Using this de…nition, aggregate dynamics of the economy can be characterized in terms of deviations from the ‡exible price equilibrium. Finally, asset market clearing requires
1 2 See Eusepi and Preston (2007) for a more general analysis with multiple-maturity debt. 1 3 This is without loss of generality. It would be straightforward to specify separate policies for the revenues and expenditures of the government accounts without altering the substantive implications of the model. implying the sum of individual holdings of the public debt equals the supply of one-period bonds.
Aggregating household and …rm decisions provideŝ
assuming for analytical convenience, and without loss of generality, g = 0; so that s C = 1, and
where 1 Z 0Ê i t di =Ê t gives average expectations; x t =Ŷ t Ŷ n t denotes the log-deviation of output from its natural rate; r n t =Ŷ n t+1 Ŷ n t the corresponding natural rate of interest -assumed to be an identically independently distributed process; and = (1 ) (1 ) 1 > 0.
The average expectations operator does not satisfy the law of iterated expectations due to the assumption of completely imperfect common knowledge on the part of all households and …rms. Because agents do not know the beliefs, objectives and constraints of other households and …rms in the economy, they cannot infer aggregate probability laws. This is the property of the irreducibility of long-horizon forecasts noted by Preston (2005) .
To summarize, the model comprises the structural relations (6), (7), (8), (10) and (11).
The model is closed with the speci…cation of beliefs, described next.
3 Learning: Belief Formation and the Policy Regime
Beliefs. Optimal decisions of households and …rms require forecasting the evolution of future real interest rates, income, taxes and in ‡ation. The central bank has only to forecast the current in ‡ation rate. For in ‡ation and income (or output gap), agents are assumed to use a linear econometric model, relating in ‡ation and income to the evolution of real government debt. That isx
where e x t and e t are i.i.d. disturbances. The model contains the same variables that appear in the minimum-state-variable rational expectations solutions to the model that result under the various policy con…gurations described in the next section. 14 And while the rational expectations solution does not contain a constant, it has a natural interpretation under learning of capturing uncertainty about the steady state.
Concerning the nominal interest rate, the …scal surplus and debt dynamics, agents'forecasts depend on their knowledge about the monetary and …scal regimes in place. Consider …rst the monetary policy regime. As in Eusepi and Preston (2008a) , uncertainty about the monetary policy regime is captured by assuming that agents do not know the monetary policy rule (6). In this case agents use the model
which is consistent with the minimum-state-variable rational expectations solutions under the various monetary and …scal regimes described in the next section. If agents know the current monetary policy regime, then, given their beliefs about future in ‡ation, they use the rule (6) to compute policy consistent forecasts of the future path of the nominal interest rate. 15 In this case, monetary policy expectations are said to be anchored.
Throughout most of the paper we assume that market participants face uncertainty about the …scal regime. Agents need to forecast the future evolution of the …scal surplus and the future evolution of debt (which is also needed to predict the evolution of output and in ‡ation).
Their model isŝ
which, again, is consistent with the di¤erent monetary and …scal regimes described in the next section. Changes in beliefs resulting from knowledge of the …scal regime are noted as they arise. When agents possess such knowledge, …scal expectations are said to be anchored.
Beliefs updating and forecasting. Each period, as additional data become available, agents update the coe¢ cients of their parametric model given by (12)- (16) x t ;^ t ;{ t ;ŝ t ;b t+1 and q t 1 = 1;b t , the algorithm can be written in recursive terms aŝ
where g t is a decreasing sequence and where! t denotes the current-period's coe¢ cient estimate. 16 Agents update their estimates at the end of the period, after making consumption, labor supply and pricing decisions. This avoids simultaneous determination of the parameters de…ning agents'forecast functions and current prices and quantities. 17
True Data Generating Process. Using (12)- (16) to substitute for expectations in (5) and solving delivers the actual data generating process
(20)
where 1 (!) and 2 (!) are nonlinear functions of the previous-period's estimates of beliefs.
The actual evolution of z t is determined by a time-varying coe¢ cient equation in the state variablesb t and r n t , where the coe¢ cients evolve according to (20) and (21). The evolution of z t depends on! t 1 , while at the same time! t depends on z t . Learning induces selfreferential behavior. The dependence of! t on z t is related to the fact that outside the rational expectations equilibrium 1 (! t 1 ) 6 =! 0 t 1 and similarly for 2 . This self-referential behavior emerges because each market participant ignores the e¤ects of their learning process on prices and income, and this is the source of possible divergent behavior in agents'expectations.
Expectations Stability. The data generating process implicitly de…nes the mapping between agents' beliefs, !, and the actual coe¢ cients describing observed dynamics, 1 (!).
A rational expectations equilibrium is a …xed point of this mapping. For such rational expectations equilibria we are interested in asking under what conditions does an economy Evans and Honkapohja (2001) .
1 7 To compare the model under learning with the predictions under rational expectations, we assume that agents' expectations are determined simultaneously with consumption, labor supply and pricing decisions, so that agents observe all variables that are determined at time t, includingbt+1. For example, the one-periodahead forecast for^ t isÊt^ t+1 =! 0;t 1 +! 1t 1bt+1 where! 0;t 1 and! 1t 1 are the previous-period's estimates of belief parameters that de…ne the period-t forecast function. They observe the same variables as a 'rational' agent. The only di¤erence is that they are attempting to learn the 'correct'coe¢ cients that characterize optimal forecasts. Finally, the central bank interest rate decision is predetermined since it is based on t 1 information (including the estimates of belief parameters).
with learning dynamics converge to each equilibrium. Using stochastic approximation methods, Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that conditions for convergence are characterized by the local stability properties of the associated ordinary di¤erential equation
where denotes notional time. 18 The rational expectations equilibrium is said to be ex- The following characterizes the set of unique equilibria under the rational expectations assumption. The analysis is analogous to Leeper (1991) , though in the context of the model of section 2. All proofs are collected in the on-line appendix unless otherwise noted.
Proposition 1 with in ‡ation dynamics determined aŝ
The coe¢ cients f 0 ; 1 ; 2 g are reported in the on-line appendix.
1 8 If 1 (!) = !, it follows from subsequent results in section 4 that 1 (!) = 0 and 2 (!) = 0 in the case of a Ricardian regime and 1 (!) = 1 and 2 (!) = 2 in the case of a non-Ricardian regime.
1 9 Standard results for ordinary di¤erential equations imply that a …xed point is locally asymptotically stable if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix D [ (!0; !1) (!0; !1)] have negative real parts (where D denotes the di¤erentiation operator and the Jacobian is understood to be evaluated at the relevant rational expectations equilibrium).
These requirements, called the Leeper conditions, de…ne the set of policies about which subsequent analysis is focused. When 1 < < (1 + ) = (1 ) the eigenvalue of the di¤er-ence equation (7) is inside the unit circle, and, for all bounded sequences f t ; i t g; real debt converges to its steady state value. Because taxes are adjusted to ensure intertemporal solvency of the government accounts for all possible paths of the price level, this con…guration of policy is termed locally Ricardian, where locally refers to the use of a log-linear approximation.
In contrast, if either 0 < 1 or > (1 + ) = (1 ), then the eigenvalue is outside the unit circle and real debt dynamics are inherently explosive. It is this property that requires a speci…c path of the price level to ensure solvency of the intertemporal accounts. Hence, locally non-Ricardian. 20
Monetary and Fiscal Regime Uncertainty
Having laid out preparatory foundations, the analysis turns to the consequences of regime uncertainty for stabilization policy. One …nal assumption is required to facilitate analytical results: the economy is assumed to have only a small degree of nominal rigidity. Formally, the conditions for expectational stability are studied in the neighborhood of the limit, ! 0. This is not equivalent to analyzing a ‡exible price economy. For an arbitrary degree of nominal friction, 0 < < 1, analytical results are unavailable except in two special cases. 21 Section 8 provides some more general numerical examples.
Under regime uncertainty, the following results obtain.
Proposition 2 Stabilization policy ensures expectational stability if and only if
1. Monetary policy is active and …scal policy is passive such that 1 < < 1 + 1 and > 1 1 ; or 2. Monetary policy is passive and …scal policy is active such that 0 < 1; and either 2 0 Two other classes of equilibria are possible. One is the case of passive …scal policy combined with a passive monetary policy satisfying 0 < < 1 for which there is indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium for all parameter values. None of these equilibria are stable under learning -see Preston (2005) . The second is the case of active …scal policy with active monetary policy. Under rational expectations it can be shown that there exist a class of unbounded equilibria that have explosive debt and in ‡ation dynamics. Evans and Honkapohja (2007) show in a model where only one-period-ahead expectations matter that such equilibria are learnable if the agents' regression model is appropriately transformed to handle the implied non-stationarity. While not denying its obvious interest, we eschew such an analysis in preference of working with a consistent belief structure.
2 1 These cases are discussed on page 17.
(a)
The proof is sketched in appendix A.1. This proposition extends results found in Preston (2006) and Eusepi and Preston (2008a) in two dimensions: by examining economies with non-zero steady-state debt and by examining con…gurations of policy that deliver nonRicardian equilibria. The mechanism giving rise to instability is the same in both Ricardian and non-Ricardian equilibria. Because monetary policy expectations are unanchored, agents fail to accurately predict real interest rates. This leads to a failure in traditional aggregate demand management through interest rate policy -see Eusepi and Preston (2008a, 2008b) for a detailed discussion and examples. When both monetary and …scal policies are not well understood, uncertainty about the monetary policy rule is the dominant source of instability.
As a consequence, stability is independent of average indebtedness. Determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium is similarly independent of this object. The sequel demonstrates that under non-rational expectations this is not generally true.
Regime uncertainty constrains the menu of policies consistent with expectations stabilization relative to the class of policies given by the Leeper conditions. If …scal policy is passive then monetary policy must be highly aggressive to prevent self-ful…lling expectations. For many monetary policies satisfying the Taylor principle there is no choice of …scal policy that can guarantee stability. The restriction on the choice of monetary policy depends on the households'discount factor, , since this parameter regulates the impact of revisions to expectations about future macroeconomic conditions on current spending and pricing decisions. The more patient are households the larger will be the impact on current macroeconomic conditions.
If …scal policy is active, policy choices are again restricted relative to a rational expectations analysis of the model. Under rational expectations, conditional on monetary policy being passive, any choice of active …scal policy delivers a unique bounded rational expectations equilibrium. Under regime uncertainty this is no longer true. The precise choice of monetary policy constrains the set of …scal policies consistent with macroeconomic stability. However, for a given choice of monetary policy there always exists a choice of …scal policy that prevents expectations-driven instability. Part 2(b) of the proposition shows that a …scal policy, characterized by either an exogenous surplus or an extremely aggressive …scal rule, is conducive to macroeconomic stability for all parameter con…gurations. 22 Thus, perhaps surprisingly, non-Ricardian regimes appear to be more robust to learning dynamics.
The learning behavior of both private agents and the central bank engenders the instability result. If the central bank could perfectly observe current in ‡ation, then the stability conditions under learning are the Leeper conditions: the same restrictions implied by local determinacy. 23 This result is special to the model at hand. Permitting multiple maturity debt is su¢ cient to undermine stability even when in ‡ation is accurately observed -see Eusepi and Preston (2007) . This is because bond prices themselves depend on expectations about future policy, which tends to make the equilibria more susceptible to instability.
Resolving Uncertainty about Monetary Policy
To isolate the role of uncertainty about the …scal regime, follow Eusepi and Preston (2008a) , Under communication of the policy regime the aggregate demand equation becomeŝ
determined by direct substitution of the monetary policy rule into equation (10). The remaining model equations are unchanged with the exception of beliefs. As nominal interest rates need not be forecast, an agent's vector autoregression model is estimated on the restricted state vector z t = x t ;^ t ;ŝ t ;b t+1 : Knowledge of the monetary policy regime does not 2 2 With an interest peg and an exogenous surplus, E-stability holds for an arbitrary degee of nominal rigidities. A proof is available in the on-line appendix. Proposition 2 also implies that for ! 1, < 0:5 guarantees stability independently of . For higher values of stability depends on the …scal rule. Furthermore, a …scal rule with > can be shown to weaken the rational expectations equilibrium relation between real debt and in ‡ation, making in ‡ation expectations less responsive to the level of real debt.
2 3 A proof for arbitrary degree of nominal rigidity is available in the on-line appendix.
eliminate uncertainty about the statistical laws determining state variables, as future output, in ‡ation, taxes and real debt must still be forecasted to make spending and pricing decisions.
And, in particular, the details of the …scal policy regime remain uncertain. 
Remark 4 The conditions in 1. and 2.(b) are also necessary conditions. Appendix A.2 provides a sketch of the proof. Regardless of the regime, guarding against expectations-driven instability for a given choice of tax rule, , requires a choice of monetary policy rule that depends on two model parameters: the household's discount factor, , and the steady-state ratio of the primary surplus to output, (or equivalently the steady-state debt-tooutput ratio since s = (1 ) b). The choice of …scal regime, re ‡ected in the implied average debt-to-output ratio, imposes constraints on stabilization policy. Less …scally responsible governments have access to a smaller set of monetary policies to ensure learnability of rational expectations equilibrium. In the case of passive …scal policies, the higher is the average debtto-output ratio, the more aggressive must monetary policy be to protect the economy from self-ful…lling expectations.
Similarly, under active …scal policies, the choice of monetary policy is again constrained by the average level of indebtedness of the economy. The higher are average debt levels the more passive must be the adopted monetary policy rule. Regardless of the policy regime, for 0 < < 1, the menu of policies consistent with stabilizing expectations is larger than when agents are uncertain about monetary policy strategy -compare proposition 2. This discussion is summarized in the following proposition which presents two special cases of the above results. That the stability of expectations depends on a steady-state quantity through is surprising when compared to a rational expectations analysis: determinacy conditions are independent of this quantity. What then is the source of this dependence?
Proposition 3 Further insight into this result can be obtained by considering a more general form of utility function with constant consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution, > 0.
Aggregate demand becomeŝ
A lower mitigates the negative output response to an expected increase in the real rate. 24
Proposition 6 Assume > . In a passive …scal regime and knowledge of the active monetary policy regime, expectational stability obtains if
A smaller intertemporal elasticity of substitution reduces the stabilizing e¤ects of anticipated shifts in the expected path of the nominal interest rate while increasing the relative importance of destabilizing wealth e¤ects. As ! , the stability condition is the same as in the case of uncertainty about the monetary policy regime. 25 However, the underlying mechanism that generates instability is quite di¤erent. In one case, instability arises from departures from Ricardian equivalence; in the other from a failure of interest rate policy to restrain demand because interest rate forecasts do not satisfy the Taylor That is, if monetary policy is su¢ ciently aggressive and the steady-state level of real debt is su¢ ciently high, then in ‡ationary e¤ects dominate, leading to instability. Fiscal policy, as re ‡ected in average indebtedness, may compromise monetary policy.
Resolving Uncertainty about Fiscal Policy
Emphasis has so far been given to resolving uncertainty about monetary policy. This apparent asymmetry resonates with actual policy making. Much has been made of the purported 2 4 In this case, the Phillips curve coe¤cient is substituted by~ = 1 . 2 5 Notice that the conditions for determinacy are not a¤ected by . 2 6 Recall part 2 of proposition 1 which demonstrates in ‡ation and debt to be positively related in nonRicardian equilibria. See also section 5.2 of Eusepi and Preston (2008c) for a simple example and further intuition.
2 7 It can be shown that the higher , the smaller the parameter set for which we have stability. In fact the larger is the weaker the relation between real debt and in ‡ation, and the more important the wealth e¤ects from higher nominal rates.
advantages of clear communication strategies in both the theory and practice of monetary policy. However, there have been limited parallel developments in the literature on …scal policy. While a detailed discussion of these issues is not possible here, the model does provide some indication that developments of the kind proposed by Leeper (2009) Proposition 7 Suppose agents have anchored …scal expectations, so that households and …rms understand that the restriction
holds at all times. Anchored …scal expectations restore the Leeper conditions as necessary and su¢ cient for stability. The special case = 0 is isomorphic in terms of stability of expectations to the more general case of anchored …scal expectations. This underscores the importance of debt dynamics to expectations stabilization: from an expectational stability viewpoint, indebtedness only matters to the extent agents are uncertain about the long-run consequences of …scal policy.
Absent anchored monetary expectations, anchored …scal expectations provide no advantages from an expectational stability perspective -the conditions of proposition 3 are operative.
Implications for the sequencing of institutional reform suggests themselves.
Finally, note that for the question of expectational stability, no speci…c assumption need be made about how the government actually intends to achieve intertemporal solvency. All that is required is agents believe government promises that the …scal regime is consistent with …scal solvency at any point in time. Given observed current debt and in ‡ation, and forecasts of future interest rates and in ‡ation, agents can infer the expected present discounted value of taxes that satis…es (24). This does not mean …scal variables are irrelevant -the projected evolution of debt is still used in forecasts. And the precise details of how taxes are actually adjusted will matter for dynamics out-of-rational-expectations equilibrium.
The Public Debt and Macroeconomic Dynamics
The preceding 
Generating Impulse Response Functions
The impulse response functions to a shock to in ‡ation expectations are generated as follows.
The model is simulated 5000 times assuming shocks to the natural rate, monetary policy and tax policy have standard deviations: r = 1, i = 0:1 and = 0:1. 28 A quarterly model is assumed giving a discount factor = 0:99. In contrast to the analytical results, more general assumptions are made about the degree of nominal rigidities and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The Calvo parameter is …xed at = 0:6, consistent with Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd (1998) and Bils and Klenow (2004) . A utility function with intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption equal to 0:3 is considered, consistent with broad …ndings in the macroeconomics literature. Monetary policy is speci…ed as = 1:5 and tax policy as = 4. Monetary expectations are anchored; …scal expectations are not.
Two levels of average indebtedness are considered: a low debt economy, which has a debtto-output ratio of zero on average, = 0; and a high debt economy with a debt-to-output ratio of 4 b= Y = 2:3 (in annual terms). While the latter is arguably large, it is chosen to emphasize the dynamics that operate in a high debt economy. It is also the only asset that can be held in this economy -there is no capital. Note also that these two economies are su¢ cient to answer the two questions posed above. High average indebtedness is only relevant to dynamics when …scal expectations are not anchored -recall section 7. A decreasing gain is employed so that g t = g t 1 + 1 where g 0 is chosen to be large enough to ensure that beliefs remain in the basin of attraction -recall the theoretical results are local characterizations of dynamics. Hence, with su¢ cient data the analytical results of the paper guarantee beliefs will converge to the rational expectations equilibrium of the model, given appropriate choice of policy. For the described calibration, we numerically verify that both economies satisfy local expectational stability conditions. A high choice of g 0 is equivalent to having a tight prior on the initial beliefs (in our experiments we chose g 0 = 50). A consequence, relevant to interpreting the impulse response functions, is the slow convergence to rational expectations equilibrium. There is no attempt here for empirical realism. Rather we seek to draw out general lessons about the mechanisms underlying model dynamics. 29
8.2 The Role of Indebtedness: …scal e¤ects in a Ricardian regime To understand the nature of these di¤erences it is useful to decompose aggregate demand into the following termŝ
! and R;t captures remaining terms. The variable R;t isolates terms that would obtain in a zero-debt economy, or equivalently, one in which …scal expectations are anchored.
;t captures departures from this benchmark, representing deviations from Ricardian equivalence because holdings of the public debt are treated as net wealth. It is the real value of holdings of the public debt once future tax and interest obligations are accounted for.
Figure 2 plots these two terms. It is immediate that ;t generates destabilizing demand e¤ects in a high debt economy. In a regime with zero steady-state debt, active monetary policy increases the expected future path of real rates reducing demand, and, in turn, curbing in ‡ation until the economy returns to rational expectations equilibrium -see Figure 2 which also plots the real long rate de…ned as
In an economy with high steady-state debt this channel is still present. However, deviations from Ricardian equivalence drive aggregate demand in the opposite direction. The term ;t initially rises because: i) taxes are predetermined at the time of the shock and only rise over time; ii) agents anticipate higher future real interest rates, which deliver a positive income e¤ect from holding the public debt; and iii) there is a valuation e¤ect from the initial fall in in ‡ation. For these reasons, the impact e¤ects of in ‡ation shock on output and in ‡ation are smaller in the high debt economy.
However, the high debt economy displays a more sluggish response to the shock. Two components of the non-Ricardian term ;t delay the adjustment of output and in ‡ation. First, as shown in Figure 1 the value of real debt outstanding rises over time increasing expected surpluses and thus future …scal tightening. 30 Second, with active monetary policy, in ‡ation below steady state induces lower expected real rates, generating income e¤ects for debt holders. The decrease in ;t mutes the stimulative e¤ects of lower expected real rates on aggregate demand, which are captured by the term R;t .
Over time long rates and taxes adjust to reduce outstanding public debt and stabilize in ‡ation, inducing convergence. In this experiment, there is a tight link between monetary and …scal policy. Active monetary policy might not be su¢ cient to stabilize expectations if market participants face uncertainty about the …scal regime and the government issues a su¢ ciently large quantity of debt on average.
Conclusions
This paper develops a model of policy regime uncertainty and its consequences for stabilizing expectations. Uncertainty about monetary and …scal policy is shown to restrict, relative to a rational expectations analysis, the set of policies consistent with macroeconomic stability.
Anchoring expectations about monetary and …scal policy enlarges the set of policies consistent with stability. However, absent anchored …scal expectations, the advantages from anchoring monetary expectations are smaller the larger is the average level of indebtedness. Finally, even when expectations are stabilized in the long run, the higher are average debt levels the more persistent will be the e¤ects of disturbances out of rational expectations equilibrium. the trace …rst. We can calculate the limit Consider now the coe¢ cients on real debt. An identical process reduces the dimensionality of the matrix B to a three dimensional matrixB. Considering the trace we get
which is decreasing in . In a Ricardian regime, > 1. Evaluating the expression at = 1, if (26) then the trace of theB matrix is negative. Evaluating the determinant we get
which is decreasing in . Again, imposing = 1 gives
Finally,
which is, again, decreasing in .Imposing = 1 yields
which is positive if (26) is satis…ed.
Non-Ricardian regime The matrices A and B corresponding to the non-Ricardian regime can be reduced to three dimensional matrices by following the same steps as above.
To further simplify the problem, we use two Lemmas.
Lemma 8 Consider the model where ! 0. Then 2 ! .
Proof. Recall that 2 = 1 2
We can then evaluate
i :
We then conjecture that as ! 0, one eigenvalue ofÃ andB tends to 1. The conjecture is veri…ed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 9 Consider the model where ! 0. Then one eigenvalue ofÃ andB converges to 1:
Proof. The characteristic equations ofÃ andB are 
which gives the following expression for ( ) = 2 2 2 + 2 (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) 2 which solves tr(B) = 0 (also shown to have positive derivative with respect to ). It can be shown that ( ) > ( ). 32 The determinant of theB matrix is equal to 1 for every parameter value.
(b) Straightforward algebraic manipulations of (27)- (29) show that the stability condition holds for all parameter values with > (1 + ) =(1 ).
3 2 It can be shown that the di¤erence betwen the denominator of and the denominator in is equal to and is negative provided the trace of the matrix for the constants is negative ( > 1 in the Ricardian …scal regime). As ! 0, the determinant is always negative, that is which is positive provided > 1 (Ricardian …scal Regime) and (30) is satis…ed.
Non-Ricardian Regime. As in proposition 2, it can be shown that one eigenvalue of both matrices A and B is equal to 1. We de…ne the trace of the constant coe¢ cients as 
